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pretation of Shelley v. Kraemer correctly appraises the true result of that
case.
CHRISTOPHER U. SYLVESTER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - RIGHT TO FAIR AND IMPARTIAL HEARING-
NEWSPAPER PUBLICITY AS AN OBSTACLE TO A FAIR TRIAL. - The defend-
ant, a Collector of Internal Revenue, was indicted by a federal grand jury
for accepting bribes and issuing false certificates. Thereafter, despite
objections by the Department of Justice, a Congressional subcommittee
conducted an open public investigation of the conduct of the defendant's
office. As a result of the nation-wide publicity given these hearings, the
defendant moved for a continuance of his trial until the prejudicial effect
of the press coverage could wear off. The motion was denied. Held, con-
viction reversed. Forcing the defendant to trial under such circumstances
denied him his right to an impartial hearing. Nor was the defendant
obliged to move for a change of venue instead of a continuance, since he
had a constitutional right to be tried in the district where the alleged
offense was committed. Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir..
1952).
The Court of Appeals did not make it clear whether it regarded its
decision as an exercise of its supervisory authority over the district courts
within its jurisdiction or as an adjudication that the defendant's rights
under either the Fifth 1 or Sixth 2 Amendments to the United States Con-
stitution had been violated. Under any view, the result seems highly
desirable. It is to be hoped that the case will have some tendency in
the future to prevent the "sensationalizing" of criminal prosecutions for
political or other purposes.
The larger issue inherent in the case is a complex one. What
practical measures can be taken, in view of the constitutional right of
newspapers to freedom of expression, to safeguard the rights of an indi-
vidual who is subjected to "trial by newspaper"? It seems clear that
direct action against the publications involved, by means of constructiie
contempt procedures, would have been ineffective. Congress can pass
no law abridging freedom of speech or of the press 3 and the same dis-
ability applies to the states by virtue of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment 4 to the Federal Constitution. While the right of
freedom of speech and press is not unlimited 5 and does not prevent the pun-
ishment of those who abuse this freedom 6 courts -are extremely reluc-
tant to proceed against newspapers for contempt of court in instances
1. "No person . . . shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.... ." U.S Const., Amend. V.
2. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed .. ." U.S. Const., Amend. VI.
3. U.S. Const., Amend. I.
4. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); see Carpenters Union
v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 726 (1942).
5. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
6. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upheld Smith Act sanctions
as not violating First Amendment); see Stromberg v. California, 282 U.S. 359. 368
(1931).
RECENT CASES
where prejudicial publicity is given to an accused person. 7 The reluctance
stems from several factors.
The famed "clear and present danger" test laid down by Mr. Justice
Holmes in Schenck v. United States 11 must be applied in determining
whether newspaper publicity surrounding a trial constitutes contempt
of court. There is no precise definition of the concept "clear and
present danger" 9 and punishment for contempt 10 violates the 'con-
stitutional guarantee of freedom of the press in the absence of a showing
that the utterances involved created a "clear and present danger" to
the fair administration of justice." Mr. Justice Frankfurter has com-
mented that the clear and present danger test tends to require proof
that interference be so imminent and so demonstrable that the power
of the courts to proceed is almost paralyzed.12 Under such a test, it seems
that free speech is favored to the extent of destroying essentially con-
flicting social interests, one of which is the right to a fair trial.
In the past, Mr. Justice Frankfurter has favored the adoption of
the English view that anything having a "reasonable tendency to interfere
with justice iii impending actions" should be punishable as a constructive
contempt."' He has pointed out that the press is equally as free in Eng-
land as in the United States and that the administration of criminal jus-
tice is more effective there than here. 14 Under English law it has been
held contempt of court for a newspaper to publish statements about an
accused person which could not be used against him at his trial.", It
has even been held to be contempt to publish a picture of the accused
person where identity is uncertain.1" Such decisions manifest a scrup-
ulous regard for the rights of accused persons which contrasts in an extrem-
ely favorable manner with the treatment often accorded them in this
country.17
7. The famous criminal lawyer, Clarence Darrow, has been quoted as saying,
"The truth is that the courts and the lawyers don't like to proceed against news-
papers. They are too powerful. As the law stands today there is no important crimi-
nal case where the newspapers are not guilty of contempt of court day after day. All
lawyers know it, all judges know it, and all newspapers know it. But nothing is
done about it." Perry, The Courts, The Press and the Public, 30 Mich. L. Rev.
228, 234 (1931).
8. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
9. See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 348 (1946).
10. I.e., punishment for constructive contempt of court by a publication which
interferes with the court's fair administration of justice.
11. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) (intemperate criticism of judge
held not contempt); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941) "'Clear and
present danger' . . . is a working principle that the substantive evil must be ex-
tremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be
punished." Cf. Near v. Minnesota, 282 U.S. 697, 715 (1931).
12. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 532 (1951) (dissenting opin-
ion).
13. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 295 (1941) (dissenting opinion).
14. See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 359 (1946) (concurring opinion).
15. Rex v. Tibbitts, 1 K.B. 77 (1901).
16. Rex v. Daily Mirror, 1 K.B. 845 (1927).
17. The law of constructive contempt has been accorded general approval in
England. It has completely prevented newspaper convictions or acquittals. Since
the public trial as distinguished from the preliminary proceedings can always be
fully reported, it would be impossible for the doctrine of contempt of court to inter-
fere with the fundamental principle of the open administration of justice. See Good-
hart, Newspapers and Contempt of Court in English Law, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 885(1935). The real source of the evil is the invasion of politics into the administra-
tion of law. Some writers contend that political influences impinge upon the entire
process of law enforcement and everyone connected therewith, and that the accused
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No attempt at contempt proceedings took place in the instant case.
Had they been attempted, the logical answer on the part of the newspapers
would have been that it was the congressional committee which
caused and stimulated the pre-trial publicity and which therefore might
be considered the proximate cause of the evil. Moreover, if the news-
papers had been silenced by contempt proceedings, an important objective
of the Congressional committee would not have been attained,18 since the
committee had stated that considerations of public interest demanded a
public investigation at that particular time.' 9  Of what value would
a public investigation be if there were no vehicle of expression to carry
the results to the public? In its larger aspects, the problem in cases
such as this is at least partially concerned with the doctrine of separation
of powers.2 0 Since contempt proceedings in cases of this type obviously
present no remedy of a practical character, the only other course of action
open is to delay the trial until public attention becomes centered upon
other matters.
The only North Dakota case dealing with such a problem was decided
in 1914. 2 1 An editor who had charged that a pending hearing in the North
Dakota Supreme Court was the result of a plot to hold a fake hearing
before an approaching election was convicted of contempt of court. In
its opinion the court said, "Surely there must come a time when the rights
of the free speaker are overshadowed by the rights of other men to
unhampered justice." 22
ALBERT M. CIRISTOPHER
EQUITY - INTERLOCUTORY MANDATORY INJUNCTIONS - NEGATIVE DE-
CREE ORDERING DEFENDANTS TO CEASE FROM REFRAINING TO PURCHASE
ADVERTISING SPACE. - The plaintiff was engaged in the publication of
news in interstate commerce. The defendants, owners and operators of
hotels and restaurants in the area, jointly decided to discontinue adver-
tising in the plaintiff's newspaper, thereby threatening its continued pub-
lication. Plaintiff brought action under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act on
the theory that the discontinuance of his paper would create a monopoly
in the only other paper in the vicinity. On Plaintiff's motion for a prelim-
inary injunction the court held that an interlocutory injunction having the
mandatory effect of ordering Defendant to continue advertising in Plain-
tiffs newspaper would be issued. Greenspun v. McCarran, 105 F.Supp.
66 (D.Nev. 1952).
In this case the use of the extraordinary power of the court when act-
ing as a court of equity appears to have been carried to an unprecedented
extreme. Relief by affirmative mandatory injunction was at one time
is prosecuted by a politician before a political judge. Actually trial by newspaper
could be stopped if judges, even those who are not elected, would use the contempt
powers that are in their hands. See Perry, The Courts, the Press, and the Public,
30 MictL. Rev. 228 (1951).
18. Cf. Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
19. See Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 110, 114 (1st Cir. 1952).
20. Cf. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (dissenting opinion).
21. State v. Nelson, 29 N.D. 155, 150 N.W. 267 (1914).
22. Id. at 162, 150 N.W. at 269.
